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Abstract
Although the deontic, responsibility/caring, and aretaic moralities have been extensively 
investigated, the relation among them, namely the relation between the aretaic and the 
deontic and responsibility moralities, have rarely been studied. To fill in this gap is the main 
goal of this study. In the first part, we set the context for the study of the relation between 
the aretaic and the deontic and caring moralities, while arguing that Kohlberg’s theory 
is mainly a deontic moral theory. Second, we elaborate on the reasons why Kohlberg did 
not introduce an aretaic morality into his theory. Third, we show that Kohlberg’s reasons 
to exclude this type of morality from his moral theory are problematic. Fourth, we argue 
that much could be gained if moral psychology took the aretaic morality and its relation 
to the deontic and caring/responsibility moralities into account. Fifth, we present the 
main findings of an exploratory research on preadolescents’ (n = 32) and adolescents’ (n 
= 32) deontic, aretaic and responsibility evaluations of hypothetical actions, and analyze 
the relations among these evaluations. Finally, we summarize the main ideas of this 
study; refer to some of its limitations; point to some examples for future research; and 
claim that our suggestion of an aretaic-deontic-responsibility model may contribute to 
the understanding of one’s moral functioning. However, this suggestion requires further 
methodological and empirical efforts.
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Uma súplica pelo estudo da relação entre a Moralidade Aretaica e as Moralidades 
Deôntica e de Responsabilidade
Resumo
Embora as moralidades deôntica, aretaica e de responsabilidade tenham sido muito 
investigadas, a relação entre elas, nomeadamente a relação entre a moralidade aretaica e 
as moralidades deôntica e de responsabilidade, têm sido raramente estudadas. Estudar 
esta última relação é o principal objetivo deste estudo. Na 1ª parte, estabelecemos o con-
texto para o estudo desta relação, enquanto argumentamos que a teoria de Kohlberg é, 
acima de tudo, uma teoria sobre a moralidade deôntica. Na 2ª parte, elaboramos sobre 
as razões que levaram Kohlberg a não introduzir uma moralidade aretaica na sua teoria 
sobre a moralidade. Na 3ª parte, mostramos que tais razões são problemáticas. Na 4ª 
parte, argumentamos que há muito a ganhar se a psicologia da moralidade tiver em conta 
a moralidade aretaica e as suas relações com a moralidade deôntica e a moralidade da 
responsabilidade ou do cuidar. Na 5ª parte, apresentamos os resultados principais de uma 
pesquisa exploratória sobre as avaliações dêonticas, aretaicas e de responsabilidade feitas 
por um grupo de pré-adolescentes (n = 32) e adolescentes (n = 32) relativas a acções 
hipotéticas, e analisamos as relações entre tais avaliações. Finalmente, sumarizamos as 
principais ideias deste estudo; referimo-nos a algumas das suas limitações; sugerimos 
exemplos de investigações futuras; e argumentamos que as relações entre estes três tipos 
de moralidade podem constituir um modelo, o modelo aretaico, deôntico e de responsa-
bilidade, que nos ajude a compreender a transição da cognição moral para a acção moral. 
No entanto, esta sugestão requere mais investigação metodológica e empírica.
Palavras-chave: moralidade aretaica; moralidade deôntica; moralidade da responsabilidade; 
funcionamento moral; Kohlberg
INTRODUCTION
When we commit a moral action, we generally judge it to be: (a) morally right 
in terms of deontic judgments or judgments “of what is [morally] right”  (Kohlberg, 
1984, p. 517; see also Frankena, 1973; Nucci, Narvaez, & Krettenauer, 2014; Turiel, 
1983); (b) obligatory for the self in terms of responsibility judgments or judgements 
“to act on what one has judged  to be right” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 517), that is, judg-
ments expressing “a commitment to act on one’s deontic judgments” (Kohlberg & 
Candee, 1984, p. 52; see also Bergman, 2002, 2004; Blasi, 1993, 1999, 2004; Gilligan, 
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1982); and (c) virtuous and praiseworthy in terms of aretaic judgments, that is, 
“judgments about the moral worthiness of an action or person” (Kohlberg, 1984., 
p. 514), and hence in terms of virtue or arête involved in the action or person at 
hand. Arête is a Greek word that dates back to Aristotle’s (1941) virtues ethic, and 
means the moral worth or excellence of a given action or one’s character (see, for 
example, Boyd, 1977; Frankena, 1973; Lourenço, 2000; MacIntyre, 2007; Nussbaum, 
1999; Smith, 2012; Solum, 2004; Watson, 1996). These three types of judgments 
and reasoning, whose operationalization can be made, for example, according to 
the procedure described in the empirical research reported below, and the rela-
tions among them may contribute to the understanding of one’s moral functioning, 
namely the transition from moral cognition to moral action.
Before justifying this possible contribution, it is worth mentioning that responsi-
bility judgments and reasoning can be equated to caring reasoning and judgments. 
This happens, for example, in Gilligan’s (1982) moral theory [see also Skoe’s (1998) 
work on care reasoning]. Gilligan, for example, has appealed to an ethic of care 
and responsibility (not to an ethic of deontic justice), according to which we should 
not turn away from someone in need (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987), not to receive 
social approval (i.e., a social approval orientation), but because of a genuine moral 
concern or moral responsibility to help needy others (i.e., a caring/responsibility 
orientation). Needless to say, a social approval orientation represents a lower moral 
orientation than a caring moral orientation, for, in last analysis, the former is more 
oriented to the self than the others (see Kohlberg, 1984).
Why the relation among the deontic, responsibility, and aretaic judgments and 
moralities may contribute to the understanding of one’s moral functioning, namely 
the understanding of the complex problem of the passage from moral cognition 
to moral action (Blasi, 1980)? Theoretically and also with basis on everyday life, it 
seems reasonable to assume that one’s deontic judgments (“I should steal to save 
a human life”) lead more easily to the subsequent action (to effectively steal to 
save a human life) if those judgments are followed by (1) a responsibility or caring 
judgment (“I am really committed and have a moral responsibility to steal to save 
a human life”); and (2) an aretaic judgment (“To steal to save a human life is a 
praiseworthy, laudable, meritorious, and virtuous act”). In other words, it makes 
sense to claim that one’s deontic judgments are more likely to be converted into 
moral action if they are followed by a commitment to act in accord with what one 
thinks it should be done, responsibility judgments (Blasi, 2004; Kohlberg & Candee, 
1984; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; McNamee, 1978; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009), and if 
one finds it virtuous and praiseworthy to follow the course of action judged to be 
right and obligatory for the self shortly before, aretaic judgments (see Boyd, 1977; 
Frankena, 1973; MacIntyre, 2007; Nussbaum, 1999). 
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This means that deontic, responsibility/caring, and aretaic judgments may be 
thought as cognitive motivations that increase one’s willingness to behave morally. 
Although the links between motivation and judgment may be complicated (Hardy, 
2006), both Kohlberg (1984) and Piaget (1983), just to cite two well-known moral 
researchers, argued for the motivational power of moral cognition.
It is worth mentioning that the motivational power of one’s moral cognition, 
be it deontic, caring, or aretaic, on one’s moral behavior tends to be overlooked 
by many moral researchers, namely by those who fault Kohlberg’s theory for pay-
ing little, if any, attention to the role of motivation in one’s moral behavior and 
development (e.g, Colby & Damon, 1992, 1995). Moral development means an 
increasing ability to differentiate, coordinate, and rank different perspectives or 
viewpoints when situations of moral conflict and choice are the case, such as hap-
pens, for example, in hypothetical (Kohlberg, 1984; Rest, 1984, 1986) or real-life 
moral dilemmas  (Gilligan 1982). We may say that the majority, if not all, theories 
of morality that intend to be an alternative to Kohlberg’s approach to morality 
rely, among others things, on the idea that his approach (a) lacks a motivational 
focus (Colby & Damon, 1995; and (b) is too much based on an ethic of justice at 
the cost of an ethic of care and responsibility (Gilligan, 1982) and a virtues ethic 
a la Aristotle and his emphasis on the principle of eudaimonia or one’s fulfillment 
or self-actualization (Campbell & Cristopher, 1996).
A significant contribution to the understanding of one’s moral functioning 
has been claimed by several authors and researchers. For example, according to 
Gilligan (1982) and Skoe (1998), although Kohlberg had overlooked an ethic of 
care and responsibility, this type of ethic, with its emphasis on the ideas of caring, 
benevolence, and concern, plays a central role in one’s moral functioning. However, 
according to Kohlberg (1984), his ethic of justice also includes an ethic of care and 
concern, namely with our relatives and friends (see Zizek, Garz, & Nowak, 2015). 
In addition to this, Kohlberg rightly noticed that caring and benevolence cannot 
solve conflicts of welfare when competing claims in situations of moral conflict 
and choice are the case. Aretaic judgments and morality and their relation with 
caring or responsibility judgments and morality have no room in Gilligan’s and 
Skoe’s thinking on caring reasoning.
A significant contribution to the understanding of one’s moral functioning 
was also proposed by Haidt (2001, 2007) through his social intuitionist model. 
According to this model, we first form our moral judgments and decisions with 
basis on intuitions and emotions and then give reasons for them, our reasons serv-
ing as ex-post facto rationalizations to convince ourselves/others that our moral 
judgments and decisions are a reason-based process. The role of emotions in any 
behavior is indisputable (Damasio, 1999). It should be mentioned, however, that we 
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cannot exclude reason from our moral judgements and decisions. More precisely, 
we cannot judge an action to be moral or immoral without taking into account 
the moral reasons or intentions underlying our decisions (Kohlberg, 1984). In 
other words, to dismiss the role of reason in one s´ moral decisions and behavior 
amounts to depriving them of their very nature. As far as we know, Haidt’s social 
intuitionist makes no reference to aretaic judgments and their possible relation 
with deontic and responsibility judgments. 
A significant contribution to the understanding of one’s moral functioning 
was also advanced by Rest (1984, 1986) with his four components model: moral 
sensitivity or one’s propensity to see a given situation (e.g., a drowning boy) as 
neutral or moral (component 1); moral judgment or one’s ability to emit a moral 
judgment in the situation at hand (e.g., I should/should not help the drowning boy, 
component 2); moral motivation or one’s inclination to help the drowning boy 
(component 3); and moral decision or one’s determination to perform a moral act 
(e.g., to risk his/her life to help the focal boy, component 4). However, everyone 
who understands Kohlberg’s theory knows that component 2 of Rest’s model is also 
present in Kohlberg’s (1984) theory of deontic judgments, duties and rights. More 
to the point, a careful analysis of Kohlberg’s theory also reveals that his theory 
appeals to moral motivation, component 3 of Rest’s model. Suffice it to say that (a) 
his deontic judgements have a motivational power (Kohlberg, 1984); (b) although 
ignored by several critics of Kohlberg’s theory (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992, 1995), 
he argued that one’s moral behavior is also related to a generalized motivation to 
self-esteem, self-confidence, self-realization, and self-regulation (see Kohlberg, 1987, 
p. 312). As will be argued below, Kohlberg’s theory of deontic justice is at complete 
variance with an aretaic morality and reasoning. 
As moral psychology is a broad research domain, there are other alternatives 
to Kohlberg’s theory. For the sake of simplicity and space limitations, we point 
only to two additional examples: Turiel’s (1983) social domain approach and his 
idea that one’s moral behavior has more to do with coordination of domains 
(e.g., moral, conventional, prudential, and personal) than only with the moral 
domain, and Blasi’s (2004) self-identity theory, according to which we behave 
morally to preserve our self and identity. However, both Turiel’s social domain 
approach and Blasi’s self- identity theory make no reference to aretaic reasoning, 
judgments and morality.
Three caveats are in order at this point. First, the deontic-responsibility-aretaic 
model suggested in this study should be seen as complementary rather than an 
alternative to Kohlberg’s theory or other moral approaches. Parenthetically, it 
should be noted that if progress in any science was as a function of the number 
of theories it contains, then psychology, be it cognitive, social, or moral, could be 
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considered to be the queen of sciences, which is not the case. In other words, the 
present study simply aims to emphasize the aretaic morality and its possible relation 
to the deontic and responsibility moralities, and suggest that these relations may 
contribute to the understanding of one’s moral functioning, namely the transition 
from moral cognition to moral action. Second, the present study is exploratory in 
its very nature. We know of no study similar to the present one. Third, the pres-
ent study deals with aretaic, deontic, and caring or responsibility cognition, not 
with moral behavior.
Despite its strengths, Kohlberg’s theory does not go without problems, some of 
which are mentioned here. For example, as suggested by an anonymous reviewer of 
an earlier version of this study, research about moral conflicts involving concerns 
about others’ welfare (Jaffe & Hyde, 2000; Juujärvi, 2005) has shown that both genders 
invoked care-based judgments rather than Kohlbergian justice-based judgments.
It is widely accepted (Modgil & Modgil, 1986; Puka, 1995) that Kohlberg’s (1971, 
1981, 1984) theory excels in the analysis of a deontic morality, a morality having to 
do with the concepts of right/wrong, just/unjust, and the like. Kohlberg’s theory, 
however, deals insufficiently, among other things (see Narvaez, 2008; Puka, 1991), 
with the area of moral caring or responsibility, a moral area related to one’s obliga-
tions to the others and the self (see Blasi, 1993, 2004; Gilligan, 1982; Skoe, 1998); 
and does not take into account the aretaic morality, an area of morality concerning 
the science of virtue and “the concept of praise/blame when we make normative 
judgments about persons, either of a person as a whole or of some part of a per-
son’s character” (Boyd, 1977, p. 69; see also Frankena, 1973; Smith, 2012; Watson, 
1996). In other words, Kohlberg’s (1984) theory is, above all, a philosophical and 
psychological theory of deontic reasoning. As he put it: “Our philosophical theory 
of deontic justice reasoning is not, however, a theory guiding aretaic judgments, that 
is, judgments about the moral worthiness of an action or person” (Kohlberg, 1984, 
p. 514). In fact, his theory: (a) conceives of morality in terms of a Kantian, deontic 
justice (Campbell & Cristopher, 1996). Suffice it to say that on several occasions he 
claimed that “… justice is the basic moral principle” (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 220; see also 
Puka, 1995; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999); (b) asks participants deontic 
questions and justifications (e.g., “Should we steal to save a human life? Why/Why 
not?”, see Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, b); (c) codes individuals’ moral reasoning, for 
example, in terms of normative, utilitarian, perfectionist, and fairness elements 
(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, p. 42); and (d) ends up by attributing a deontic stage or 
a score of deontic reasoning to the individual (see Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, b). In 
contrast to these deontic aspects, Kohlberg’s reference to aretaic judgments and 
morality is rare. He even sustained that his theory of deontic justice has nothing 
to do with the moral worth of an action or person. In addition to this, he seems 
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to treat the aretaic morality and judgements as if they were an epiphenomenon 
included in the area of responsibility judgments and morality. In Kohlberg’s words, 
“…the judgment of responsibility includes an element which Frankena calls aretaic, 
‘a judgment of the morally good, bad, responsible, or blameworthy.’” (1984, p. 518).
In what follows we (a) ref lect on Kohlberg’s reasons to exclude an aretaic 
dimension from his moral theory; (b) show that these  reasons do not go without 
problems; (c) argue that there is much to be gained if moral psychology takes the 
aretaic morality and its possible relation to the deontic and responsibility morali-
ties into account; and (d) present, succinctly, the main findings of an exploratory, 
empirical study we carried out on the relations among preadolescents’ and adoles-
cents’ deontic, aretaic, and responsibility evaluations of some hypothetical actions 
related to one of Kohlberg’s dilemmas described below.
KOHLBERG’S REFUSAL OF AN ARETAIC DIMENSION
Why did Kohlberg not introduce an aretaic dimension into his moral theory, 
even though this dimension may contribute to the understanding of one’s moral 
functioning, namely the transition from moral cognition to moral action? It is 
worth mentioning that the passage from moral cognition to moral action is a recur-
rent problem in moral psychology in general (Bergman, 2002; Blasi, 1980, 1983; 
Narvaez, 2008), and Kohlberg’s theory in particular (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984).
We think that such a refusal is mainly due to two types of reasons. The first 
type has to do with moral and philosophical reasons intrinsic to Kohlberg’s (1981, 
1984) theory, namely his opposition to an ethical relativism or a “bag of virtues”-
oriented morality, and his defense of an ethic universalism, according to which 
all individuals should be treated with respect. The second type has to do with 
Kohlberg’s interest in “hard” structural stages, such as Piaget’s cognitive stages, 
as opposed to “soft” or functional stages, such as Loevinger’s (1976) stages of ego 
development (see Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990). 
Regarding the first type of reasons, it should be noted that the late Kohlberg 
defended that respect for people, a mixture of justice and benevolence (Kohlberg, 
Boyd, & Levine, 1990), is a fundamental moral principle, and represents a return 
of his Stage 6, a Stage he had abandoned in his book, The measurement of moral 
judgment: Standard issue scoring manual (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987b). As a result, 
he refused to evaluate the moral worthiness of any individual. In Kohlberg’s (1984) 
views, to argue for an aretaic hierarchy would amount to thinking that some persons 
are more worthy morally than others. However, as he put it, “[p]ersons who make 
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Stage 5 or Stage 6 [deontic] judgments are not in our theory [of deontic justice] 
more worthy or morally better persons than those who make Stage 3 or Stage 4 
[deontic] judgments”  (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 514). 
Concerning the second type of reasons, Kohlberg sustained that when he thought 
of “…three domains of moral reasoning” [i.e., .the deontic domain of the right and 
obligatory, the aretaic domain of the worthy and approvable in human action and 
character, and the domain of ideals of the good life], his “deontic justice domain” was 
the only one “… that is amenable to definition in terms of ‘hard’ sequential hierar-
chical stages such as are defined by Piaget” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 4). Parenthetically, it 
should be said that the Piagetian cognitive stages and the Kohlbergian moral stages 
are not so “hard” and structural as Kohlberg (1984) realized (see Carpendale, 2000; 
Carpendale & Krebs, 1992, 1995; Chapman, 1988; Lourenço, 2016). For example, 
research about real-life morality has shown that the most important predictor of 
the morality usage is the type of moral conflict (e.g., a caring-oriented dilemma 
vs. a justice-oriented dilemma) rather than, for example, moral stage a la Kohlberg 
(Carpendale & Krebs, 1995) or gender (Jaffe & Hyde, 2000).
In summary, two types of reasons underlie Kohlberg’s refusal of an aretaic 
morality. First, his theory of deontic justice avoids making judgments about the 
moral worthiness of an individual or his/her moral/immoral acts and argues for 
an ethical universalism. Second, interested in hard structural stages, Kohlberg 
believed that the deontic domain was the only one that was amenable to hard 
structural and sequential stages
A PROBLEMATIC REFUSAL
The two types of reasons why Kohlberg refused to introduce an aretaic dimension 
into his theory are understandable at first glance. However, these reasons become 
problematic and even unjustified when we see them critically. 
Understandable as it may be, Kohlberg’s refusal to make judgments about the 
moral worthiness of an action or person in order to maintain equal respect for 
all people does not imply to exclude an aretaic dimension from a moral theory. It 
seems that Kohlberg confounded worthy persons with worthy actions. However, 
one thing is to attribute a certain moral worthiness to a given action (e.g., to steal 
to save a human life is a highly virtuous, praiseworthy, laudable, and meritorious 
act). It is another, quite different thing to judge the author of that action as more 
or less morally worthy than people behaving differently, for example, not to steal to 
save the human life at hand. In a nutshell, for a theory to argue for moral respect 
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for all people, the theory has not to eschew attributions of moral worthiness to a 
moral or immoral action committed by a certain individual. In addition to this, 
Kohlberg’s claim that “a higher stage is philosophically [and in deontic terms] a 
better stage” (1984, p. 4) than its predecessor seems somehow inconsistent with 
Kohlberg’s other claim that “[p]ersons who make Stage 5 or Stage 6 judgments are 
not in our theory more worthy persons or morally better persons than those who 
make Stage 3 or Stage 4 judgments” (1984, p. 514). If the second claim were the case, 
then, according to Kohlberg, an action informed, for example, by deontic  reasons 
consistent with his Stage 5 (e.g., Heinz stole the drug to save his wife because he 
thinks that “… the right to life supersedes or transcends the right to property”; 
Colby & Kohlberg, 1987b, p. 11) could not be qualified as more worthy morally than 
an action informed by deontic reasons consistent with his Stage 3 deontic reasons 
(e.g., Heinz stole the drug “… because he tried to be decent”; Colby & Kohlberg, 
1987b, p. 7). However, it   seems evident that, when an individual does not steal 
because s/he thinks that the right to property has precedence over his/her personal, 
egocentric desires, s/he commits a more worthy, virtuous,  praiseworthy, and laud-
able action than when s/he does not steal because s/he is afraid of being put in jail. 
If this is the case, then an individual who always commits worthy, praiseworthy, 
laudable, and virtuous actions is more worthy morally than an individual who 
always commits unworthy, blameworthy, and non-virtuous actions.
More importantly, according to Kohlberg (see Kohlberg & Candee, 1984), 
compared to a lower deontic stage, a higher deontic stage is more likely to lead to 
responsibility judgments and, hence, to moral action. If this is true, then Kohlberg’s 
other claim that a “… more adequate mode of [deontic] reasoning is neither nec-
essary [n]or sufficient to define the person who makes [this more adequate mode 
of deontic reasoning] as morally worthy or virtuous” (1984, pp. 514-515) seems to 
be an odd claim. If this were the case, then we would be entitled to say that those 
who tend to behave morally with basis on their advanced deontic moral reasoning 
are not more worthy or virtuous morally than those who tend to behave immor-
ally with basis on their elementary and egocentric interests and needs. However, 
to adhere to this position would amount to espousing a relativistic stance, which 
is at complete variance with Kohlberg’s assumption of rational universalism and 
value relevance: “The assumption of value relevance implies that moral concepts 
are not to be understood as value neutral but are to be treated as normative, posi-
tive, or value relevant”; the assumption of universalism implies that moral concepts 
are not to be treated “… in a totally value-relative way” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 215).
As for Kohlberg’s conviction that, among other domains, the aretaic domain is 
not, in contrast with the deontic justice domain, “… amenable to definition in terms 
of ‘hard’ sequential hierarchical stages such as are defined by Piaget” (1984, p. 4), 
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it should be said that such a conviction is not to be treated as a metaethical, but an 
empirical claim. As such, only empirical studies can show us whether or not the 
individual’s aretaic judgments and evaluations change over time in terms of hard 
sequential hierarchical stages such as defined by Piaget. As is known, Kohlberg 
(1984) conceptualized three successive and hierarchical levels of deontic reason-
ing (preconventional, conventional, and postconventional), and Gilligan (1982) 
advanced three successive and hierarchical levels of caring reasoning (preconven-
tional, conventional, and post-conventional). In this vein, albeit subject to empirical 
corroboration, it makes sense to think of three successive and hierarchical levels 
of aretaic reasoning: a preconventional aretaic level according to which virtuous 
actions are those that bring about our well-being, needs and desires; a conventional 
aretaic level according to which virtuous actions are those that lead to others’ well-
being, needs and desires; and a postconventional aretaic level according to which 
virtuous actions are those that, at the same time, take into account and coordinate 
in terms of fairness our and others’ legitimate interests, such as, for example, to 
attain a state of self-actualization in Maslow’s (1943) terms. As the aretaic domain 
is a moral domain conceptually distinct from both the deontic and the caring moral 
domains (see Boyd, 1977; Lourenço, 2000), the presumption of these levels of aretaic 
reasoning different from both deontic and reasoning levels seems to be justified.
Here, it should be said it is ironic that Kohlberg’s structural levels and stages 
of deontic reasoning have been informed, not by Piaget’s views on moral develop-
ment, but by Piaget’s initial views on cognitive development (see Wright, 1982). 
First, when discussing, in his seminal book, The moral judgment of the child, how 
the child comes to understand and follow the rules of marbles’ game (i.e., le jeu des 
billes), Piaget made it clear that heteronomous morality and autonomous morality 
are not two global stages of moral development because these two types of morality 
represent “… two moral attitudes [that] may coexist at the same age in the same 
child.” (1932, p. 101). Second, with the passage of time, Piaget’s (1983) early idea 
of hard structural cognitive stages was mitigated and, in the process, his cognitive 
stages came to accommodate to the idea of asynchrony, heterogeneity, and content 
in development (Carpendale, 2000; Chapman, 1988; Keller, Eckensberger, & von 
Rosen, 1989; Lourenço & Machado, 1996).
In summary, there are good motives to say that Kohlberg’s reasons to exclude 
an aretaic dimension from his moral theory are problematic. First, to proclaim 
that any individual should be treated with respect does not imply that we cannot 
classify his/her moral or immoral actions and choices as virtuous and praiseworthy 
or as non-virtuous, and blameworthy. Second, only with basis on empirical work 
can we say that the aretaic domain is not amenable to definition in terms of hard 
sequential levels.
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WHAT COULD BE GAINED IF THE ARETAIC MORALITY AND ITS 
RELATION TO THE DEONTIC AND RESPONSIBILITY MORALITIES 
WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT?
First, because aretaic morality has to do with the concept of praise/blame and 
the moral worthiness of either a person or his/her actions (see Boyd, 1977, p. 69), 
this type of morality is conceptually distinct from both deontic morality, whose 
main injunction is that we should not treat others unfairly (see Kohlberg, 1984), 
and caring or responsibility morality, whose main injunction is that we should “… 
not to turn away from someone in need” (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987, p. 281). Thus, 
the aretaic morality seems to constitute a domain that can originate theoretical 
debate and empirical research different from that generated by both the deontic 
and responsibility moralities.
Second, in addition to constituting a conceptually independent area of theoretical 
debate and empirical research, aretaic judgments may also help us understand the 
highly debated problem of the transition from moral cognition to moral action (see 
Blasi, 1980, 1983, 2004; Colby & Damon, 1992, 1995; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Rest, 
1984; Rest et al., 1999). Several theorists and researchers (e.g., Blasi, 2004; Colby & 
Damon, 1995; Rest, 1984) have faulted Kohlberg’s theory for not introducing into his 
theory a motivational factor which would be of help  to explain the transition from 
moral cognition to moral action. Note, however, that, as alluded to earlier, Kohlberg 
sustained that “[t]he basic motivation for morality is rooted in a generalized moti-
vation for acceptance, competence, self-esteem, or self-realization.” (1987, p. 312). 
More to the point, according to Kohlberg (1984), this transition is mediated by two 
intervening judgments: deontic judgments, which have a deontic decision function, 
and responsibility judgments, which have a follow-through function. More precisely 
(see Kohlberg & Candee, 1984), as individuals move from stage to stage, they are 
more likely to make judgments of responsibility consistent with their deontic judg-
ments, and thus they are more likely to act in accord with what they think to be right.
Third, although the consistency between moral cognition and moral action tends 
to increase with development (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; McNamee, 1978), such 
consistency is not perfect even among postconventional subjects. This means that 
the transition from moral cognition to moral behavior entails more than deontic 
and responsibility judgments. Given that aretaic judgments are focused on what is 
approvable, virtuous, and worthwhile in moral actions, it makes sense to think of 
them as an additional cognitive motivation for moral action. To think of aretaic 
judgments as a possible cognitive motivation for moral action does not mean that 
they are more related to moral behavior than their deontic or responsibility/car-
ing counterparts. So, it seems natural to think that the more one sees as worthy 
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and virtuous (aretaic evaluation) an action judged to be right in deontic terms 
(deontic evaluation) and obligatory for the self in terms of moral responsibility 
(responsibility evaluation), the more one is likely to perform such an action, and 
thus the greater the consistency between one’s moral cognition and one’s moral 
action will be. Only further research can determine whether that which makes 
sense theoretically is indeed the case in empirical terms.
As far as we know, there is no empirical study relating one’s aretaic judgments 
to his/her moral behavior. The present study does not address either such a possible 
relation because the study deals with moral cognition (deontic, aretaic, responsibil-
ity), not moral behavior.
In what follows we elaborate a bit more on what could be gained if moral psy-
chology took into account the aretaic domain as well as its possible relation to the 
deontic and responsibility/caring domains. As referred to above, the aretaic domain 
is conceptually grounded on theoretical work that distinguishes aretaic judgments 
about the moral worth or virtue of particular actions from deontic judgments of 
rightness and obligation. As Boyd pointed out, “when we use right/wrong we are 
not making claims about what is intrinsically worthwhile, but rather about how we 
should act toward each other” (1977, p. 68). But if the aretaic domain is a conceptual 
domain distinct, for example, from Kohlberg’s (1984) deontic domain and Gilligan’s 
(1982) caring domain, then both empirical and theoretical psychological research 
on the aretaic domain and its possible relation to the deontic and responsibility 
domains is conceptually grounded.
Because morality deals with the way things ought to be, not the way things are, 
theories of moral development implicitly accept that some moral judgments or 
actions based on such judgments are, in deontic terms, closer than other judgments 
or actions to what may be called the moral point of view (see Kohlberg, 1984), or 
a given moral telos or end sate. However, to accept this deontic hierarchy amounts 
to assuming that the more a certain judgment or action is close to that moral telos, 
the more this judgment or action deserves to be seen as worthwhile and approvable 
in terms of virtue or arête. In short, to appeal to an aretaic dimension of morality 
is to include in the moral domain a dimension that, as it were, seems to belong to 
this domain almost naturally or intrinsically.
The study of an aretaic morality may turn out to be heuristic, among other things, 
for a better understanding of one’s deontic and responsibility judgments, and also of 
the possible relations among these three types of moral judgment (deontic, aretaic, 
responsibility). For example, according to some authors (e.g., Boyd, 1977), but not 
others (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984), what makes more sense is to see aretaic judgments as 
dependent upon deontic judgments. In Boyd’s words, “for the concept of praise/
blame to be applicable we have to have already made a judgment about the right” 
129
 PSYCHOLOGICA VOLUME 62 Nº 2 • 2019
Aretaic Morality and the Deontic and Responsibility Moralities
(1977, p. 68). True as this statement may be, it also makes sense to think that our 
judgments about what is right/wrong, deontic judgments, are partly determined by 
the aretaic value we attribute to what is seen as right/wrong in a particular choice 
or situation, aretaic judgments. In other words, the more one judges an action to 
be praiseworthy in aretaic terms, the more it will tend to be judged as right in 
deontic terms. In contrast with Boyd, Kohlberg (1984) thought that what makes 
more sense is not a relation between the deontic domain and the aretaic domain, 
but between the responsibility domain and the aretaic domain. Actually, according 
to Kohlberg (1984), deontic judgments have not any aretaic implications (p. 514), 
whereas a responsibility judgment includes an aretaic element (p. 518). Accordingly, 
it makes good sense to think that a moral action we are committed to performing, 
a responsibility judgment, is something that we tend to see as worthwhile for the 
self, an aretaic judgment. However, it also makes good sense to think that the more 
we believe that an action is worthwhile and meritorious, the more we are inclined 
to perform it in terms of commitment and responsibility.
SOME EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ARETAIC 
MORALITY AND THE DEONTIC AND RESPONSIBILITY MORALITIES
Thus far, we only know of an empirical study that examined the relation between 
aretaic judgments and deontic judgments in a sample of undergraduate students 
(Lourenço, 2000). In what follows we present brief ly the main findings of a study 
we carried out on the relation among the aretaic, deontic, and responsibility judg-
ments and evaluations in a sample of preadolescents and adolescents.
Participants, tasks, procedure, and scoring
Participants were 32 11- to 13-year-olds (16 boys and 16 girls; Mage = 12.20 
years; SD = 0.64), and 32 15- to 17-year-olds (16 boys and 16 girls; Mage = 16.10 
years; SD = 0.25). They came predominately from middle-class families living in 
the area of Lisbon, Portugal. All participants were white. Parents of all children 
involved in this research gave written permission for their children to participate 
in the study by using an appropriate consent form. Both participants and parents 
were assured that this research would follow the ethical procedures approved by 
the Psychological Association from their country and the American Psychological 
Association (2010).
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Each participant was confronted with four hypothetical actions informed by 
reasons that were consistent with Stage 3 deontic reasons and referred to Kohlberg’s 
Joe hypothetical dilemma. This dilemma, of which each participant received a writ-
ten version, describes the case of a 14-year-old boy (Joe) and his father. The father 
promised that his son could go to camp if he saved up the money for it himself, 
what Joe did. Just before camp is going to start, the father changed his mind. Some 
of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip and Joe’s father was short of 
the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved. Joe 
didn’t want to give up going to camp, so he thinks of refusing to give his father 
the money (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, p. 3).
The four hypothetical actions were described in a booklet given to each par-
ticipant and presented by the experimenter (a graduate psychology student) in 
the following manner. First hypothetical action:  Let’s suppose that Joe gave his 
father the money “… out of love and to preserve their relationship” (see Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987b, p. 239). This is an authority oriented-action in terms of moral 
issue (authority vs. contract), and a caring-oriented action in terms of moral orien-
tation (caring vs. social approval). Second hypothetical action: Joe gave his father 
the money “… so that others do not form a bad impression, image, or opinion of 
him” (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987b, p. 190). This is an authority and social approval 
oriented-action. Third hypothetical action: Joe refused to give the father the money 
because the father “should have a concern for how Joe feels and not demand the 
money” (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987b, p. 189). This is a contract and caring-oriented 
action. Fourth hypothetical action: Joe refused to give the father the money “to 
show others his good character, or so that he will leave a good impression” (Colby 
& Kohlberg, 1987b, p. 189). This is a contract and social approval-oriented action. 
As can be seen, of the four actions, two actions were oriented to the contract 
issue (e.g., “Joe did not give the father the money”), and two actions were oriented 
to the authority issue (e.g, “Joe gave his father the money”). For each set of two 
contract- or authority-oriented actions, one pointed to a caring orientation (e.g., 
“Joe gave the father the money out of love and to preserve their relationship”), and 
the other to a social approval orientation (e.g., “Joe gave the father the money so 
that others do not form a bad impression, image or opinion of him”). Hypothetical 
actions were classified in terms of moral issue (contract or authority) and moral 
orientation (caring or social approval) by two independent coders and experts in 
Kohlberg’s theory. This classification was made according to Kohlberg’s scoring 
system (see Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, b). Interrater reliability between the two inde-
pendent coders was 100 percent agreement. Finally, participants were asked to make 
deontic, aretaic, and responsibility evaluations of each of the four presented actions 
on a five-point-scale (i.e., “Do you think that such an action was highly correct/
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right - 5 points; only correct/right - 4 points; neither correct/right nor incorrect/
wrong - 3 points; only incorrect/wrong - 2 points; or highly incorrect/wrong - 1 
point?”). A similar procedure was used to assess participants’ aretaic evaluations 
(e.g., “Do you think that such an action was highly virtuous and praiseworthy - 5 
points; … ; or highly non-virtuous and blameworthy - 1 point?”), and responsibility 
evaluations (“Do you think that Joe was highly decided/committed to performing 
such an action - 5 points;  … ; or highly decided/committed to not performing 
such an action  1 point”?). Aretaic, deontic, and responsibility scores were summed 
and then averaged (see Appelbaum & McCall, 1983). Aretaic, deontic, and respon-
sibility mean scores could range from 1 to 5. In order to avoid order effects, the 
order of presentation of each type of judgement (deontic, aretaic, responsibility), 
moral issue (authority, contract) and moral orientation (caring, social approval) 
was counterbalanced across subjects. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The findings for males and females were combined, since no statistically sig-
nificant gender differences were found in any of the possible comparisons when 
appropriate statistical analyses (t tests) were performed. Suffice it to say that the 
greater difference between boys (M = 3.0, for deontic-caring evaluations) and girls 
(M = 3.25, for aretaic-social approval evaluations) showed to be to a non-significant 
difference, t (62) = 1.289, p > .05.
This finding is inconsistent with Gilligan’s (1982) idea that when they speak in 
moral terms, women tend to speak in terms of an ethic of care and responsibility, 
and men in terms of an ethic of deontic justice, duties and rights. Gender differences 
in the moral literature have been a highly debated and controversial question. This 
debate is mainly due to Gilligan’s claim that (1) women are predominantly oriented 
to an ethic of care and responsibility and men are predominantly oriented to an 
ethic of justice, duties, and rights; and (2) men tend to score higher than women 
when both are assessed on Kohlberg’s moral interview (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, 
b). Overall, review of literature on gender differences in moral development has 
disconfirmed both of Gilligan’s claims (Jorgensen, 2006; Puka, 1991; Walker, 1986). 
Concerning gender differences in terms of care and justice reasoning, research 
about real-life moral dilemmas (Wark & Krebs, 1996) has shown that type of moral 
conflict (e.g., caring dilemma vs. justice dilemma, hypothetical moral dilemmas vs. 
real-life moral dilemmas) rather that gender determines, for example, one’s type 
of moral reasoning (e.g., caring reasoning vs. justice reasoning; e.g., Jaffe & Hyde, 
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2000, one’s level of moral development (Carpendale & Krebs, 1995), and so forth. 
Needless to say, it is beyond the scope of this study to make a comprehensive review 
about the role of gender in one’s moral cognition and behavior
Participants’ aretaic, deontic and responsibility evaluations
Table 1 presents the aretaic, deontic, and responsibility mean scores and standard 
deviations as a function of age (11-13- and 15-17- year-olds), moral issue (contract 
and authority), and moral orientation (caring and social approval). Examination 
of the data in Table 1 reveals three consistent patterns. 
Table 1
Aretaic, deontic, and responsibility mean scores and standard deviations as a function of age, 
moral issue, and moral orientation
Age Moral  
Issue
Caring Social Approval
Aretaic Deontic Responsibility Aretaic Deontic Responsibility
11-13
years 
Contract 3.53 3.31 3.72 2.88 2.84 3.56
Authority 4.31 4.19 4.41 3.06 3.03 3.66
Total 3.92 3.75 4.06 2.97 2.94 3.61
15-17
years 
Contract 3.25 3.41 3.59 1.88 1.84 3.41
Authority 4.34 4.00 3.88 2.53 2.34 3.34
Total 3.80 3.70 3.73 2.20 2.09 3.37
Note: Each cell could range from 1 to 5.
First, regardless of age, moral issue, and moral orientation, a given mean score 
never appeared twice, which, as could be expected, shows some variability in this 
pattern. Actually, it would be almost impossible to get 24 equal mean scores when 
three independent variables (age, moral issue, and moral orientation) were the 
case. Even so, participants’ aretaic mean scores were not much different from their 
deontic and responsibility counterparts. When t tests for all possible comparisons 
(16) between aretaic and deontic mean scores, and between aretaic and responsibil-
ity mean scores were performed, there was only one comparison that showed to be 
statistically significant, t (62) = 2.00, p < .05. This comparison refers to an aretaic 
mean score (M = 4.34, for authority issue, older group) and a deontic mean score 
(M = 2.34, authority issue, older group). Deontic vs. responsibility comparisons 
could have been performed. We did not perform them because the main goal of this 
exploratory study was to examine the neglected relation between aretaic morality 
and judgments and deontic and responsibility judgments and moralities.
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This significant finding notwithstanding, data in Table 1 remind us more of 
an aretaic-deontic-responsibility parallelism than an aretaic-deontic-responsibility 
differentiation. Actually, t values for the other 15 comparisons were always non-
statistically significant (p > .05)
An aretaic-deontic parallelism was also found in previous studies (e.g., Lourenço, 
2000). These two parallelisms do not lend support to Kohlberg’s (1984) idea that 
his deontic judgments and morality have nothing to do with aretaic judgments and 
morality. These parallelisms also indicate that, however much it makes sense in 
theoretical terms, our suggestion of an aretaic-deontic-responsibility model, this 
suggestion should be seen cautiously. Note, however, that the present empirical 
research is exploratory and deals with moral cognition, not with moral action. The 
fact that the same mean score never appeared twice (see Table 1) suggests that the 
first mentioned parallelism is, say, a mitigated parallelism and, to an extent, is also 
consistent with our above mentioned suggestion (see more in the Conclusions section). 
This last suggestion, however, should be also seen with caution because, as said on 
the previous page, it would be almost impossible to get 24 equal mean scores when 
three independent variables (age, moral issue, and moral orientation) were the case.
Second, the younger group’s aretaic, deontic, and responsibility evaluations did 
not differ significantly from those of the older group. In fact, when t tests for all 
possible comparisons relative to age differences were performed, even the greater 
difference between the two age groups (M = 2.88, for the younger group, aretaic 
evaluations, contract issue, social approval orientation, vs. M = 1.88, for the older 
group, aretaic evaluations, contract issue, social approval orientation) showed to 
be a non-significant difference, t (62) = 1.282, p > .05.
If we have in mind that the participants in this study were preadolescents and 
adolescents, one may think that, according to Kohlberg (1984), they were probably and 
predominantly conventional individuals, and hence, the evaluations at hand would not 
be subject to a significant age effect. So, the inexistence of an age effect on participants’ 
moral evaluations involved in this study is consistent with previous literature on one’s 
moral development (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984; Rest, 1984, 1986). This literature shows that pre-
adolescents and adolescents did not differ much in their level of moral development, that 
is, in their ability to differentiate, coordinate and rank order different “voices”, interests or 
viewpoints when competing claims in situations of moral conflict and choice are the case.
Third, when differences between caring and social approval evaluations were 
statistically analyzed, t tests showed that there was only one significant differ-
ence between caring evaluations (M = 4.34, for the older group, aretaic morality, 
authority issue) and social approval evaluations (M = 2.34, for the older group, 
deontic morality, authority issue), t (62) = 2.000, p < .05. Even so, regardless of age, 
type of morality, and moral issue, caring-oriented actions were always considered 
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to be more right, worthy, and likely to be performed than their social approval 
counterparts. This consistent pattern in all possible comparisons (12) is difficult 
to explain in terms of mere chance.  Will it be that statistically non-significant 
results may have a significant psychological meaning?
This consistent pattern is relatively consonant with findings of the only study we 
know that studied the relation between the aretaic morality and the deontic morality 
and also compared caring evaluations with social approval evaluations (Lourenço, 2000; 
see also Nunner-Winkler, 1984). We say relatively consonant because, in that study, 
caring evaluations were always higher than social approval evaluations. However, the 
difference between both types of evaluations was always statistically significant, what 
was not the case in the present study. This pattern also shows that a moral theory 
should incorporate a caring dimension, this being consistent with Gilligan’s (1982) 
emphasis on the role of an ethic of care and responsibility in one’s moral function-
ing (see also Skoe, 1998) and partly consistent with Kohlberg’s (1984) idea that his 
ethic of justice also incorporates an ethic of care, namely an ethic of care having to 
do with one’s family and friends. In this vein, it should be mentioned that the late 
Kohlberg (Kohlberg et al., 1990) come to defend that respect for people – a mixture 
of justice and caring – is a fundamental moral principle. This Kohlberg’s claim is 
an additional reason for considering that his theory of deontic justice and morality 
is not at complete variance with Gilligan’s (1982) ethic of care and responsibility.
Relation between the aretaic evaluations and the deontic and responsibility evaluations
In this study, we were particularly interested in the relation between the aretaic 
morality and the deontic and responsibility moralities. Table 2 presents these two 
kinds of relation as a function of moral issue (contract and authority) and moral 
orientation (caring and social approval).
Table 2
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between participants’ aretaic evaluations and their deontic and 
responsibility evaluations as a function of moral issue and orientation
Type of Comparison  Aretaic/Deontic Aretaic/Responsibility
Authority/Caring .76;  p < .01 .05; ns.
Authority/Social approval .76;  p < .01 .29;  p < .05
Contract/Caring .59;  p < .01 .28;  p < .05
Contract/Social approval .73;  p < .001 .18;  ns.
*p < .05; **p < .01
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Examination of Pearson’s correlation coefficients presented in Table 2 shows 
that for the entire sample, participants’ aretaic evaluations were more strongly 
related to their deontic evaluations than to their responsibility evaluations So, not 
only were the aretaic/deontic correlations more frequently significant (all of the 
four possibilities) than their aretaic/responsibility counterparts (only two of the 
four possibilities), but also when they were statistically significant, the correlation 
coefficients having to do with the aretaic/responsibility relation were much lower 
(r = .290; r = .280) than their aretaic/deontic counterparts (r = .760; r = .590).
These two findings show that the participants in the present study considered 
that the aretaic morality was more related to the deontic than the responsibility 
morality. These findings are consistent, for example, with Boyd’s (1977, p. 69) idea 
that when we make deontic judgments, which are part and parcel of a deontic 
morality, we tend also to make use of the concepts of praise/blame, virtuous/non-
virtuous, laudable/non-laudable, which are key concepts in an aretaic morality. 
These findings, however, do not go well, for instance, with Kohlberg’s idea about 
the relation among aretaic, deontic and responsibility judgments and moralities. 
According to Kohlberg’s thesis, it would be expected that there would be a stronger 
relation between the areatic morality and the responsibility morality than between 
the aretaic morality and the deontic morality. Suffice it to say that Kohlberg stated 
that “… the judgment of responsibility [not the deontic judgment] includes an ele-
ment which Frankena calls aretaic…” (1984, p. 518). These two findings have deep 
implications for our suggestion that, along with other moral approaches described 
in the Introduction section, an aretaic/deontic/responsibility model may contrib-
ute to the understanding of one’s moral functioning. These implications will be 
discussed in the Conclusions section
CONCLUSIONS
In this article we have claimed for the study of an aretaic morality and reasoning, 
namely the study of the relation between this type of morality and reasoning, and 
the deontic and responsibility moralities and reasoning. In this vein, we suggested 
that a model that takes into account these three types of morality and reasoning 
(the aretaic-deontic-responsibility model) may contribute, along with other moral 
approaches (e.g, Kohlberg’s (1984) theory of deontic justice; Gilligan s´ (1982) theory 
of an ethic of care and responsibility; Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model; Rest’s 
(1984) four components model) to the understanding of one’s moral functioning, 
namely the passage from moral cognition to moral action (Blasi, 1980, 1983).
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As already said,  the idea of an aretaic morality and reasoning has no room, for 
example, in Gilligan s´ (1982) theory of an ethic of care and responsibility, Haidt’s 
(2001) social intuitionist model, Rest’s (1984) four components model, or Blasi’s 
(2004) theory of moral identity, just to cite four examples.  However, in theoretical 
terms, it makes much sense to think that the more one sees as laudable, worthy and 
virtuous (aretaic judgment) an action judged to be right in deontic terms (deontic 
judgment) and obligatory for the self in terms of moral responsibility (responsibility 
judgment), the more one is likely to perform such an action, and thus the greater 
the consistency between one’s moral cognition and one’s moral action will be.
We know of no study that has tried to confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis 
in empirical and behavioral terms. Although empirical, the research reported in 
the present study deals with moral cognition (deontic, aretaic, and responsibility/
caring), not with moral action.
In addition to presenting this research, the current study also argued and 
showed that: (1) Kohlberg’s theory is mainly a theory of deontic justice; (2) moral 
and philosophical reasons intrinsic to his theory and his interest in hard structural 
stages partly explain why Kohlberg excluded the aretaic dimension from his theory 
of deontic justice; and (3) Kohlberg’s reasons for such an exclusion are problematic 
and even unjustified.
As noted in the previous section, participants’ aretaic evaluations were more 
strongly related to their deontic evaluations than to their responsibility evaluations. 
What are the implications of  this finding for our suggestion (see also Boyd, 1977) 
that there is a difference among deontic, aretaic, and responsibility reasoning and 
morality and, hence, that we can think of an aretaic/deontic/.responsibility model 
that, along with other approaches to morality, may contribute to the understanding 
of one’s moral functioning?
First, given that (a) two of the four correlation coefficients having to do with 
the aretaic/responsibility relation were not statistically significant, and (b) the two 
correlation coefficients that were statistically significant were quite low, then we 
may conclude that aretaic reasoning and morality is, to some extent, distinct from 
responsibility morality and reasoning.  These findings are, to an extent, consistent 
with our idea of introducing an aretaic dimension into the moral domain.
Second, it is true that the four possible correlation coefficients for the aretaic/
deontic relation were statistically significant. However, no correlation was perfect 
(1.0), and one correlation was only a moderate correlation, r = .590. These two 
facts show that aretaic reasoning and morality is not reducible to deontic reason-
ing and morality and, hence, there is room for the aretaic reasoning and morality 
within the moral domain, such as suggested by the aretaic/deontic/responsibility 
model. These facts are also consistent with Boyd’s thesis that “the area of moral-
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ity concerning the concept of right/wrong [deontic morality] is different from the 
“concept of praise/blame [aretaic morality] when we make normative [and deontic] 
judgments …” (1977, p. 69; see also Lourenço, 2000).
The finding that participants’ aretaic mean scores were relatively similar to 
their deontic and responsibility counterparts (see Table 1) seem to show that 
there are some commonalities among the three types of morality focused on this 
study. Because of this similarity, the idea that aretaic reasoning and morality is 
non-reducible to either deontic or responsibility reasoning and morality should 
be seen cautiously.
However, when a consistent pattern is found (e.g., caring-oriented hypothetical 
actions were always considered to be more right, worthy, and likely to be performed 
than their social approval counterparts; there was no aretaic, deontic or responsi-
bility mean score that has appeared twice), we wonder whether we cannot say that 
the pattern is psychologically meaningful even when it is only corroborated by few 
statistically significant results.  As for the finding that there was no aretaic, deontic 
or responsibility mean score that has appeared twice, it would be almost impos-
sible, as mentioned earlier, to get 24 equal mean scores when three independent 
variables (age, moral issue, and moral orientation) were at issue.
In other words, in theoretical terms, it makes sense to suggest an aretaic-deontic-
responsibility model that may contribute, along with other approaches to morality, to 
the understanding of one’s moral functioning. Although conducted at a cognitive, not 
behavioral level, the present research is, to some extent, consistent with this suggestion
As is often the case, a study generally raises more questions than those it solves. 
The present study constitutes no exception.
For example, it might be objected that we speak of one’s moral functioning, yet 
the study remains at a verbal and cognitive level. Needless to say, a comprehensive 
account of one’s moral functioning has also to be based on one’s moral behavior. 
This means that further empirical research is needed to see to what extent one’s 
moral behavior is affected by one’s aretaic, deontic, and responsibility reasoning.
The relation between deontic cognition and moral behavior has been frequently 
researched (see Blasi, 1980, 1983). The same is true regarding the relation between 
responsibility/caring cognition and moral behavior (e.g., Gilligan, 1982). We know 
of no study addressing the relation between aretaic reasoning and moral behavior. 
To study this possible relation is an additional example for further moral research.
To perform a study addressing, at the same time, the role of one’s aretaic, deontic, 
and responsibility cognition in one’s moral behavior was never performed. Such a 
study could constitute, say, a critical study for our suggestion that aretaic, deontic, 
and responsibility reasoning may contribute to the understanding of one’s moral 
functioning in general and one’s moral behavior in particular.
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We often refer to one’s moral functioning. However, our experimental sample 
only involved preadolescents and adolescents. So, to investigate a main theoreti-
cal assumption of the present study – the more one sees as laudable, worthy and 
virtuous (aretaic judgment) an action judged to be right in deontic terms (deontic 
judgment) and obligatory for the self in terms of moral responsibility (responsibility 
judgment), the more one is likely to perform such an action, and thus the greater 
the consistency between one’s moral cognition and one’s moral action will be – 
waits for being studied at the behavioral level among different age groups (i.e., a 
cross-sectional study) and even through a longitudinal study.
It might also be objected that the idea of equating care reasoning to responsibility 
reasoning is not accepted by all moral researchers, Blasi (1999) for example. Here, we 
follow Gilligan’s voice and his emphasis on an ethic of care and responsibility, that is, 
her idea that we should be concerned with others’ welfare and have even a moral respon-
sibility to help needy others. As already noted, Gilligan spoke about an ethic of care 
and responsibility, not about two ethics: an ethic of care and an ethic of responsibility.
It has been argued and shown that individuals think and behave differently in 
moral hypothetical dilemmas and in real-life dilemmas (e.g., Carpendale & Krebs, 
1992, 1995). Thus, we might have got different results if a real-life moral had been 
employed. So, the use of a hypothetical dilemma in the present study could be 
judged to be other of its limitations.  However, when we conduct research we have 
to make choices because we cannot study almost everything at the same time.
Last, but not the least, it could also be objected that people think and behave 
differently in justice dilemmas and caring dilemmas (see Modgil & Modgil, 1986). 
So, we might think that we could have obtained different results if a caring instead 
of a justice dilemma were used.
Critic John Horgan once said that “… all empiricism in the world cannot salvage 
a bad [and unclear] idea” (1999, p. 27). We are fully aware that the majority of pres-
ent findings speak more in favor of an aretaic/deontic/responsibility parallelism 
than an aretaic/deontic/responsibility differentiation. Needless to say, it is the idea 
of differentiation, not parallelism, that lies at the heart of our suggestion to think 
of an aretaic/deontic/responsibility model as a contribution to the understanding 
of one s´ moral functioning.
Despite the fact that the majority of present findings do not lend support to our 
suggestion, to argue for a distinction among aretaic, deontic, and responsibility 
judgements, reasoning, and moralities seem to be a good and clear idea. This means 
that we should not give it up even when its empirical corroboration is far from 
being well substantiated. We know that positive results and findings are generally 
considered to be better findings and results that negative ones. However, negative 
findings can be more challenging than positive ones for the former may stimulate 
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more research than the latter. In addition to this, when negative findings are the 
case they can be seen as more reliable than positive findings because researchers 
prefer to get positive rather than negative findings.
We know of no dictionary that does not distinguish the concepts of right/wrong, 
just/unjust, which lie at the heart of a deontic morality (see Kohlberg, 1984), from 
either the concepts of praise/blame, virtuous/non-virtuous (see Boyd, 1977), which 
are key concepts in an aretaic morality (see Frankena, 1973), or the concepts of 
caring/not caring, responsibility/non-responsibility, which are central concepts 
in a caring-oriented morality (see Gilligan, 1982). Note also, for example, that the 
idea of distinction among domains of social knowledge, between an ethic of justice 
and an ethic of care, between a deontic morality and an aretaic morality pervades, 
respectively, Turiel’s social domain approach, Gilligan’s (1982) work on different 
moral voices, and Kohlberg’s (1984) theory of deontic justice.
It is often the case that good and clear ideas were not corroborated, for example, 
because of limitations of the focal study. In addition to those mentioned above, our 
procedure did not ask participants to justify their aretaic, deontic, and responsibility 
evaluations. This means, among other things, that our attempt to conceive of one’s 
moral functioning as involving an aretaic dimension, a deontic dimension, and a 
responsibility/caring dimension is an attempt that requires further methodological 
and empirical efforts.
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